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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 06-5145
________________
DON WILLIAM JACKSON,
               Appellant
   v.
FDC-HONOLULU DISCIPLINE HEARING
COMMITTEE; CAMERON LINDESY,
WARDEN, USP CANAAN
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-01643)
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell
____________________________________
Submitted For Possible Summary Action Under
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 14, 2007
Before:  BARRY, AMBRO and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 17, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Don William Jackson, an inmate at USP-Canaan, appeals the District Court’s
denial of a petition he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  As explained below, because
2the appeal does not present a substantial issue, we will summarily affirm the judgment of
the District Court.
In his petition, Jackson challenges the result of a prison disciplinary hearing at
which he was found guilty of using marijuana.  According to Jackson, he was arrested on
February 9, 2004.  Later that day he arrived at FDC-Honolulu, where officials began
taking urine samples from him three days later based on information received from a
confidential informant.  All the tests performed within 36 days of his arrival were positive
for THC, a metabolite of marijuana.  As a result of the test on March 17, 2004, Jackson
received an incident report.  He was charged with use of narcotics, found guilty, and
received as sanctions loss of visitation for six months, window visits only for six months,
and 60 days’ segregation, to be served consecutively.  Jackson also states that he was
placed in a higher security prison, and cannot be transferred to a facility closer to his
family.
In his petition Jackson does not contest that THC was found in his urine but
complains that the verdict was not properly supported and should be expunged from his
prison file.  According to Jackson, he had been regularly using marijuana for 15 years and
was smoking it on the day of his arrest. Moreover, the marijuana he used was highly
potent and thus, especially in light of his weight (more than 300 pounds), more likely to
remain longer in his system.  Jackson complains that the prison refused to hear testimony
from a toxicologist who would have “dispute[d] the DHO finding of thirty days as the
time frame of THC in a persons [sic] system,” and points out that all his urine tests after
1We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District Court’s
decision de novo.  Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002).
3
March 17, 2004, were negative.  He also complains that the prison refused to hear
testimony from the arresting FBI agent, who would have explained that Jackson was
smoking marijuana right up to his arrest, and that the testing policies at FCD-Honolulu
are “out dated and could not be used to support the finding of narcotic use within the first
thirty six days of incarceration.”
The District Court declined to decide whether Jackson’s petition was properly
treated as a § 2241 petition or a § 1983 complaint but found his claims meritless anyway
and denied the petition.  This appeal followed.1
Jackson should have brought his action under § 1983 rather than § 2241.  He does
not allege that he will stay in prison longer as a result of the disciplinary proceedings, nor
do his claims otherwise implicate the fact or duration of his term of incarceration.  See
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997);
Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2002).
Jackson’s claims fail under § 1983 because he does not allege that he has suffered
a violation of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.  As the District Court
explained, the penalties he suffered are not atypical and significant in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.  As a result, the BOP had no obligation to provide due
process.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Torres, supra.  Nor were Jackson’s
due process rights implicated by such collateral consequences as participation in
4programs and the location of the prison in which he is housed.  See Olim v. Wakinekona,
461 U.S. 238 (1983) (prisoner has no constitutionally protected interest in the place of his
confinement); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (liberty interest of prisoner not
implicated by transfer from medium to maximum security); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S.
78, 88 n.9 (1976) (due process clause not implicated by prison officials’ decisions
concerning inmate classifications).
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
